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Successful industrial mobilization is recognized as
fundamental to the success of a military mobilization. The
U.S.'s present system for allocation of raw materials and
component parts is the Defense Priorities and Allocation
System (DPAS) . DPAS represents a major mechanism for
industrial mobilization. Its success or failure to meet
mobilization requirements is an excellent gauge for overall
industry-military performance in a mobilization.
Through a review of current regulations and procedures, a
study of past industrial mobilizations in wartime and of
recent mobilization exercises, this study demonstrates that
DPAS can adequately allocate limited resources during
mobilization if the critical materials requirements are
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current international focus on arms control and the
potential for U.S. force reductions reemphasize the
importance and necessity for adequate industrial
mobilization plans. Recent studies have documented the
United States' dependence on foreign sources for raw
materials and various component parts and the significant
impact this would have on the U.S.'s ability to mobilize
industry. It can safely be assumed that sometime during the
mobilization process the demand for specific raw materials
and particular component parts will exceed the available
supply.
The current system for allocating raw materials and
component parts during an industrial mobilization is the
Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS)
.
This thesis will investigate the functioning of the
Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS) during an
industrial mobilization. Research will include a review of
general materials allocation in an industrial environment
during mobilization and include a review of the control
systems that were used in the past.
This thesis will review the current regulations and
procedures that govern DPAS. It will analyze the "lessons
learned" from previous industrial mobilizations and recent
mobilization exercises to see if the current DPAS is
adequate. This thesis will focus on the materials
allocation portion of the DPAS.
The objective of this thesis is to determine if the
current DPAS will be able to adequately allocate limited
resources among the various civilian and military production
facilities during mobilization. Secondary objectives
include:
1. identifying current problems facing DPAS.
2. researching to see if lessons learned from past wars
and recent mobilization exercises have been
incorporated into the DPAS.
3. identifying improvements that could be made to the
current system.
The methodology of this thesis will be to conduct a
comprehensive examination of current literature and conduct
interviews with personnel involved in the DPAS.
The benefits of this thesis will be to provide a better
understanding of the DPAS, and to provide a review and
analysis of the DPAS material allocation procedures.
II. BACKGROUND
Materials allocation during an industrial mobilization is
briefly presented in the five sections below. Areas covered
include: (1) impact of possible force restructure, (2)
dependence on foreign sources, (3) LOGISTICS 2010, (4)
materials allocation used as the "synchronizer" of production,
and (5) methods used to control production.
A. IMPACT OF POSSIBLE FORCE RESTRUCTURE
Fundamental national defense issues are presently being
re-thought by defense strategists. This rethinking is in
response to the recent statements by the Soviet Union that it
may significantly reduce its military strength as well as the
current emphasis on arms negotiations, and to the reduction in
the U.S.'s defense budget.
Moreover, this rethinking involves the acknowledgement
among defense and diplomatic experts that the likelihood of a
nuclear war is very small. The past thinking that nuclear
weapons enabled the U.S. to reduce its conventional force
structure equated to the conclusion that any future large
conflicts would be short in duration. The previous thinking
is being replaced with the general position that '^ny future
large conflicts would probably last for a considerable length
of time and that the winner of any future large conflict would
be the nation (s) best able to sustain a long conflict. This
sustainability would be in direct proportion to the existing
stocks of equipment and supplies, and the nation's ability to
mobilize its industrial base to produce the additional
equipment and replace the equipment destroyed in the conflict.
. The move to put more emphasis on Reserve components and
less on active duty forces becomes a critical issue of U.S.
force structure. The Reserve concept carries with it two
significant requirements: (1) the reliance on America's
ability to mobilize both its military forces and current
equipment/supply inventories, and (2) the nation's ability to
expand its economy to produce the equipment and supplies to
fill the mobilization shortfall and carry the war machine
during any sustained conflict.
Mobilization will doubtless require substantial transfer
of resources from peacetime to military outputs. The Nation's
ability to expand its economy in the production of war
material is referred to as industrial mobilization or economic
mobilization. The importance of industrial mobilization,
especially considering the present rethinking, demands that
industrial mobilization be a vital part of the U.S. national
security planning process
When discussing industrial mobilization, there are two
issues: one, involves the actual mobilization itself, and
two, the actual plans for a mobilization. The actual
mobilization is, naturally, contingent on the actual plans for
mobilization. The bureaucratic complexity of the planning and
execution of the plans on systems controlling industrial
mobilization is evident when one reviews past conflicts.
Industrial mobilization at its basic level requires three
simple ingredients: labor, production equipment, and
material. The intricacies of a war economy can be viewed by
studying the facets of one of the fundamental ingredients of
industrial mobilization—material. Control of the material
supplies used to produce the weapons of war is required during
all facets of an industrial mobilization. This would include
the stage prior to declared war where strategic planners have
convinced politicians to increase the military procurement
budget in preparation for the official declaration of war, the
dynamic growth stage where the economy is in the process of
change from a producer of primarily consumer goods to a
producer of primarily military goods, to a period of
sustainability where current industrial capacity is full and
the emphasis is on building new capacity and looking for
scarce material substitutes.
B. DEPENDENCE OF FOREIGN SOURCES
In assessing the future mobilization material needs, the
U.S.'s current position is one of significant foreign
dependence on specific materials used in defense production.
For a variety of reasons, the U.S. is dependent on foreign
sources for not only some specific critical raw and semi-
refined materials but also for a variety of component parts.
The importance of a reliable source of materials for
industrial mobilization has resulted in numerous studies
covering this area since the late 1970 's.
For primarily economic and environmental reasons, the U.S.
as shown on Figure 1 relies heavily on foreign producers for
a significant amount of basic production ingredients, both raw
and semi-refined. Although the U.S. has abundant resources
and idle capacity in the basic steel materials, the U.S. is
deficient in the materials used in high technology defense
production. Combining this fact with the political and
economic instability of Third World exporting nations, where
we get most of our raw iiiaterials for high technology items,
and the typical long logistic pipeline, the risk is high that
in the event of a large conflict these materials would be in
short supply.
One example is ferroalloys:
Ferroalloys represent a basic processing industry sector
that provides essential raw materials to many streams of
manufacturing. As a key component of steel manufacturing,
ferroalloys are important to national security. By
imparting unique characteristics to finished steel and cast
iron and by inhibiting by-products which diminish steel
quality, ferroalloys are irreplaceable to steel production.
The principal ferroalloys of concern to defense planners
are: manganese, chrome and silicon. (Ellison, Frumkin,
Stanley, 1988, p. 28)
As of 1985 the domestic ferroalloy industry consisted of 17
plants employing 4100 people with shipments of 700 short
tons while working at 60 percent capacity. In general terms
this represents a 50 percent deterioration of the industry
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since 1978 when employment stood at 8500 and shipments were
in the order of 1500 short tons. (Ellison, Frumkin,
Stanley, 1988, p. 28)
Imports from 1979 to 1985 have increased from 45% of
apparent consumption to over 60 percent. Since 1985 there
has been no commercial domestic production of high-carbon
ferrochromium in the U.S. and only very limited commercial
production of high carbon ferromanganese is currently
available. (Ellison, Frumkin, Stanley, 1988, p. 31)
The U.S. dependence on foreign raw materials has been
substantiated and documented with growing concern since the
1950s. To help alleviate the foreign dependence, numerous
legislative and administrative measures have been adopted,
including the establishment of a National Defense Stockpile
(NDS) of strategic and critical materials. The NDS is
considered by most authorities to be inadequate. Thus, the
U.S. is still heavily dependent on foreign suppliers. It
should be noted that foreign dependence represents the
workings of a competitive international economy. Materials
are obtained by the U.S. suppliers from the lowest-cost
sources throughout the world irrespective of location. In
wartime some domestic sources for selected materials may
become available. Further, substitute materials may be used
in some cases for imported supplies that are cut off.
Complex weapon systems of today use numerous component and
sub-component parts. During a 1983 DoD sponsored Industrial
Response Simulation exercise, it was learned that, "virtually
all missile and sonobuoy manufacturers depended heavily upon
off-shore producers of electronic components such as
integrated circuits." (Vawter, 1985, p. 29) Additionally,
specialization and the emergence of a global market has
prompted one U.S. admiral to write.
We have always known of our nation's dependency on key raw
materials. But now spare parts and components of weapons
systems come from industrial plants far beyond our shores.
I just returned from a Navy Research and Development
facility where massive motors come from England, casting
from Israel, and special steel from Belgium--all were
products not available in the U.S. (McKinnon, 1989, p. 2)
Therefore, not only is the U.S. dependent on foreign
resources but it must almost virtually pull it from the four
corners of the earth. Another phase of foreign dependence
takes on a complex nature politically and diplomatically.
This issue involves foreign ownership of U.S. -located
production and supplier companies. For example, in the
critical issue of ferroalloys discussed previously, "Over half
of the U.S. domestically-produced ferroalloys come from non-
domestically-owned facilities." (Ellison, Frumkin, Stanley,
1988, p. 32)
During WW II the U.S. government redirected production of
numerous U.S. auto plants to military vehicle plants. Today,
the U.S. government would not have this flexibility since
Japan owns and operates parts and component distributing
facilities in the U.S. Clearly, the potential is high for a
supply disruption caused by a reluctant overseas supplier,
material losses during the long logistic pipeline, or because
of a reluctant foreign-owned domestic producer who refuses to
supply his goods to the U.S. mobilization effort.
C. LOGISTICS 2010
The DoD's awareness of the importance of mobilization
logistics planning is reflected in the 1988 edition of the
DoD's long-range logistics strategy titled Logistic 2010 .
This document includes as one of its four goals "to improve
industrial base responsiveness to DoD needs." (U.S.
Department of Defense, 1988, p. 1)
This goal is supported by an objective which is "to
improve preparedness plans for DoD organic and commercial
industrial base surge/mobilization requirements." (U.S.
Department of Defense, 1988, p. 25) This portion of the plan
includes developing requirements, identifying shortfalls in
materials for mobilization and developing plans to deal with
these shortfalls. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1988, p. 25)
p. THE "SYNCHRONIZER" OF PRODUCTION
Materials control will be a fundamental management control
task during the mobilization. This concept is substantiated
in Bernard M. Baruch ' s "Priorities: The Synchronizer of
Production," published in the Harvard Business Review in 1941.
Baruch drew on his extensive experience from WW I when he
served as the Chairman of the War Industries Board. He
postulates that priorities function as a "synchronizer" of the
production process during an industrial mobilization.
Priorities can be defined as a step function containing a
10











Figure 2. Compression of a 3-step Priority System
and a Demand Curve
Priorities which are properly used and administered will
ensure that the production machinery of a nation is
efficiently utilized. That efficiency is based on accurate
prediction of production lead times, required delivery dates
for material and components, and effective scheduling. There
is no small importance attached to acheiving the proper mix
of output even though some outputs are considered more
important, or needed sooner, than others. The objective is to
ensure that the aggregate production of the entire
mobilization effort is accomplished in the most efficient
manner. This efficiency will ensure that raw materials and
components required for different production processes will be
available for the highest program at the time it is needed and
only at that time. This will free up other raw materials and
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components for the next lower priority program. Thus, the
schedule of needed raw materials and component parts will be
allocated through the use of a priorities system and this
system when operated with accurate lead times and required
delivery dates will essentially synchronize the nation's
production in the most effective and efficient manner.
(Baruch, 1941, pp. 261-270) Introduction of a priorities
system is equivalent to introducing a second monetary system
with a second unit of account. Mobilization planning must
consider how to mesh the two systems to achieve its
objectives.
Additionally, Baruch stresses the need for having a system
of price controls accompanying a priority system because the
priority system effectively takes the place of the usual
market mechanisms that prevent undue price escalation.
E. METHODS USED TO CONTROL PRODUCTION
Materials management today is receiving, as it has in the
past, much notice. Acronyms such as JIT( Just In Time) and
MRP (Materials Requirements Planning) are considered
production control devices based on the material movement
either to the assembly line or through the assembly line.
In a mobilization environment, as supplies of raw
materials and component parts become scarce, national defense
needs add another factor called priorities. The use of
priorities attempts to ensure that the most critical military
12
needs would receive the material before the less critical
program. This, in a small way, could be analogous to the
item's market competitiveness today where responsiveness, and
therefore priorities, play a key role in terms of profit.
Based on past historical experience, viz. WW II, next to
government contracts, materials control is the most effective
tool for converting industry to war and for inducing
manufacturers to participate in the programs. (Williams, 1954
and 1957, p. 43) Materials management today, as in the past,
is receiving much notice for this very reason.
Five basic methods have been used to control scarce
materials during mobilization:
1. Cutting down the use of critical materials permitted
in specific products (accomplished by "M" or conservation
orders) . This system does not prevent the making of the
item designated in the order, but compels the producer to
find some other material to replace that which it seeks to
conserve. . .
.
2. Prohibition or limitation of the output of various
kinds of items requiring critical materials ("L" or
limitation orders) . These orders are directed against the
product itself. . .
.
3. Inventory controls. In times of emergency, producers
may be forbidden to build up excessive inventories in order
to prevent the hoarding of critical materials....
4. Priorities. A system of priorities places products
in their order of importance for purposes of meeting an
emergency. . .
.
5. Allocations. Since materials begin to run short in
an emergency, rendering the priorities system inadequate,
a system of allocations is used to divide them among the
essential programs. The feature of allocation that
distinguishes it most clearly from the priorities system is
that the contractor gets a certain quantity of available
resources rather than a preferential right to buy them if
they can be found. (Williams, 1954 and 1957, pp. 44-45)
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III. HISTORICAL REVIEW
A. WORLD WAR I UP TO WORLD WAR II
This portion of history is significant in that it
emphasized that a future war would be a world-wide war
demanding the involvement of the entire U.S. economy mobilized
to produce weapons in a magnitude never before undertaken.
(Vawter, 1983, p. 6) With the WW I experience dawned the
realization that capability and success did not equate, that
there was something missing in the formula—effective
planning. The War Industries Board was the prime vehicle for
industrial mobilization during WW I, but the Board itself was
hardly a planned organization. It was never "born." Rather,
it was more a nebulous mass of needs, resources and ideas
which coalesced slowly into a mobilization machine which
admirably fitted the requirements of an unprepared nation. It
is not wrong to say that the VJar Industries Board was a
machination of the public, a "knowing" minority of private
citizens who recognized the helplessness of a country
unprepared for war. This group includes some great military
minds such as General Leonard Wood and General Crozier who
espoused readiness although they initiated no official
actions. In 1915 Woodrow Wilson initiated the founding of the
Naval Consulting Board, which was headed by Thomas Edison and
represented the pooling of intellectual resources from 11
14
different scientific disciplines. From this Board evolved the
Committee on Industrial Preparedness whose focus was on the
whole of all military requirements, rather than just the Navy.
This organization was not a government organization. It was
financed and operated by private citizens. It was a very
worthy tool for information gathering regarding war service
capabilities of some 20,000 manufacturing plants. This body
of information was collected rapidly and made available by
September 1916. Subsequently, the information was utilized by
the Council of National Defense and the War Industries Board.
(Clarkson, 1923, pp. 12-13) In the legislative arena,
Congress passed the Military Appropriations Act which
precipitated the creation of the Council of National Defense.
Although this act was law in August of 1916, the group's first
meeting was not until December 6 of that year. This lassitude
demonstrates the dichotomous thinking between the private
sector and the Congress that represented that same sector.
The council was "intended as a peacetime body which should
prepare the country for an emergency-by thought rather than by
action, by study rather that by performance." (Clarkson,
1923, pp. 20-21) In other words, this council produced no
legislation, thus the council continued to evolve under such
notables of the time as Daniel Willard, president o^ the B and
O Railroad, Bernard Baruch, financier, Howard Coffin, Vice-
president of the Hudson Motor Company and Julius Rosenwald,
president of Sears, Roebuck and Company. These men made up
15
the Advisory Commission and represented the executive branch.
On the Council proper were the Secretary of War, the Secretary
of the Navy, the Secretary of Interior, the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of
Labor.
, It was Bernard Baruch's personal interest in the steel and
metal industries and his beneficial suggestion that the board
be attentive to industries' raw materials and how to pool
resources from industries that transformed the commission into
an official tool of the government. "The War Industries Board
in its intermediate and final forms was the lineal descendent
of the Council's dealings with raw materials, although
chronologically it took its first recognized form in the
General Munitions Board." (Clarkson, 1923, p. 27) The
understanding that control of supply of raw materials and the
means to use them meant the control of production helped mold
the future structure of the Commission. It was reduced to
committees to interact with various industries. Business
contracts between the War and Navy Departments and the
industries providing raw materials were created. On the
recommendation of the commission, the War Department applied
to Congress for monies. As the War Department was unsure of
its needs, a lump sum figure was requested, the size of which
was to be determined by Congress. Congress responded with
something less than enthusiasm. The Council of National
Defense was moved to appoint a purchasing board made up of
16
Army and Navy Department heads and officers appointed by those
heads to determine needs and make purchases. A noted
manufacturer of the time, F.A. Scott, was appointed chairman.
The name was changed to the General Munitions Board. Its
purpose was to coordinate purchases of the Army and Navy, aid
them in acquiring raw materials and in establishing precedence
of orders between the military and industry.
The General Munitions Board was quickly found to be
inadequate. It had been reduced to so many committees that it
was too decentralized. In order to remedy this serious flaw
the War Industries Board was instituted on July 8, 1917, three
months after the U.S. entry into WW I in April 1917.
(Clarkson, 1923, pp. 28-36) Its functions, briefly, are as
follows:
(1) to allocate commodities of which there was or was likely
to be a deficit, to encourage their increased production and
effect their orderly flow into channels most conducive to
the purposes of war, which necessitated "priority" and
price-fixing; (2) to analyze, bring together, measure,
alter, and restrain the demands of the Government of the
Allies and of the public; (3) to ascertain to what extent
and in what manner the supplies could meet the requirements;
and to take the action thereby indicated. (Clarkson, 1923,
pp. 45-46)
The War Industries Board became much more than these
functions would imply when President Wilson issued the
Executive Order on March 4, 1918 endowing the board with
authority proceeding directly from the Executive Branch
itself. In effect, the war was not conducted by the military
alone but by the War Industries Board and the Military with
17
the War Industries Board "leading the charge." (Clarkson,
1923, p. 48)
Prior to entry into WW I there was a complete absence of
plans. The lack of definitive requirements, the "what and
when" of materials was stark (Clarkson, 1923, p. 5). It was
recognized among nonofficial leaders as early as 1914 that the
United States was not ready for war. This reality was not
treated officially until 1916, in the National Defense Act.
This act charged the Assistant Secretary of War with
responsibility for provisions to be made to adequately meet
the war needs by some mechanism of materials mobilization and
industrial organization. Through this Act of Congress,
evolved the Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP) (1930-31, 1933,
1936, 1939). The IMP was a sincere attempt to use lessons
learned from the WW I experience. Its accomplishments include
the spelling out of governmental organization and
administrative procedures for the mobilization of industry.
Its handicaps: who would be the opponent, where would a
confrontation occur, and what powers would really be in the
President's sphere of authority. Its modus operandi:
assignation of priorities including priority classification of
orders, allocations of specific facilities and licenses,
permits, warrants, and embargoes where needed. Control of
foreign trade was elemental to the success of the whole. Its
greatest flaw was that it did not consider the fact that the
U.S. might have to provide munitions aid to the allies.
18
Indeed, this critical issue is still with us. Its greatest
virtue: it precipitated a consciousness of planning needs and
may well have shortened the mobilization process after the
onset of WW II. (Clem, 1983, pp. 30-34)
Despite the IMP and the new IMP "consciousness", many of
the mistakes in administrative controls of WW I were repeated
during WW II. Because of the repetition of error in WW II
virtually every possible variation of industrial control
techniques were given a chance. (Novick, Anshen, Truppner,
1949, pp. 3-4) For example, there was a time during WW II
when the profound sense of urgency following the attack on
Pearl Harbor dictated that contracts providing war materials
were worthy of any price. As a prompter for production this
worked as a tonic, but as America got into full swing its
"Pandora's Box" was opened. What at one time stimulated use
of idle resources and war production, now threatened basic
production efficiency. War contractors now had their cake and
could indeed, eat it too. With more than half the nation's
resources at their disposal and extravagant financial means,
strict economy was left by the wayside. The important
foregone alternatives involved time and contracting methods
were adopted to economize on the time required. It became
evident that direct controls must be improved. This might
well have been the first "birth pains" of our modern DPAS.
(Department of the Army, 1959, pp. 275-276) It is encouraging
to note that not all mistakes were repeated. Notably, the
19
"Cost Plus Percentage Fee" contracts of WW I that had been hot
beds of abuse were not used during WW II. Only "Cost Plus
Fixed Fee" contracts were used.
One cannot discuss the success or failure of the planning
mechanism or of the industrial control techniques which
accomplished industrial mobilization without assessing the
success or failure of the War Industries Board (WIB) . The WIB
accomplished most of its feats haphazardly. It was
established three months after the United State's entry into
WW I, was not a legitimate organization until March 1918 and
had no legal status until the passage of the Overman Act in
May 1918. In fact, even the President had no general
emergency powers in the organization arena until the passage
of the above mentioned Act. (Clem, 1983, p. 25) Yet, beyond
the WIB there was no other agency to give direction to or
control over the nation's mobilization effort.
The WIB provided the first priority system. U.S.
government procurement was decentralized and uncoordinated.
The War Department had five, then later eight procurement
offices in April 1917. Other agencies had at least one such
office. Government offices bid against each other on prices,
facilities and deliveries. Only by the end of the war did
getting procurement offices to estimate requirements in
advance even have a start. (Clem, 1983, p. 27)
What came to be known as the priority system was destined to
become the most characteristic feature of the whole scheme





priorities left no room for chance or
favoritism. With priority control established, conservation
programs could be enforced, rationing programs and
curtailment could be made effective, necessary new
undertakings could be materially encouraged; the regulations
of the Board became enforceable, and that small minority,
whose tendency to disobey rules. .. could be brought into line
without unreasonable delays. (Cuff, 1973, p. 191)
Even this reasonable program was tentative. It depended
heavily on business-government cooperation which didn't always
exist beyond rhetoric. Priority policies were very slow to
evolve, were haphazard and opportunistic when they did.
There were no legal parameters, therefore no enforcement.
Hence, a priorities order meant a priorities request. This
frequently resulted in non-compliance by business and breach
of contract. There simply were no laws to prosecute abuses.
(Cuff, 1973, pp. 193-194) Moreover, the WIB had to convince
the military that centralization in a civilian agency was a
worthy goal. Not until March 1918 did the WIB have any
authority to determine priorities. By then there was much
confusion in military procurement. The new priorities board
did accomplish tightened restrictions on non-war industries,
cut back unnecessary building construction and developed a
preference list. However it was beset with legal burdens, had
no control over transportation facilities and had to leave the
responsibility for distribution to the producers themselves.
The ensuing program of restrictions was beyond the e'nforcement
and administrative abilities of the board. (Cuff, 1973, pp.
198)
21
In the postwar years, central business administrators could
not admit either to themselves or to the public at large the
extent to which the promise of voluntary business-government
cooperation was not always fulfilled, or the extent to which
the failure hindered the general mobilization program.
(Cuff, 1973, p. 219)
The Commodities sections constituted another critical set
of administrative units in the mobilization effort. Sometimes
called the "backbone" of the board, they were designed to
avert the ill effects of section 3 of the food and fuel act.
(Cuff, 1973, p. 150) Section 3 made it illegal for a
government agent or employee including advisory employees—and
that is what the WIB was--to contract for supplies in which he
was in any way interested. This clause was aimed directly at
destroying the informal network that the WIB had achieved.
The result of this legislation was a list of resignations, the
demise of the original organization of the WIB, and a distrust
in business for government, but importantly, it also acted as
a catalyst for greater mobilization in bureaucracy. (Cuff,
1973, p. 106)
What the Commodities sections did contribute was a first
governmental policy for planning for prospective needs in
advance of those needs. Provision for commodity control was
critical to the war effort. The sections also provided
protection for cooperative businesses, "it offered access to
public sanctions and the tools of public planning which could
be used for private purposes." (Cuff, 1973, p. 177)
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Price fixing, another mobilization tool of WW I was not
really instituted until March 1918. The blanket policy of the
WIB, control through cooperation, meant that price and
priority programs would be less than centralized and without
cohesion. Internal organizational problems, military
independence and inadequate legal foundations seriously
impeded price fixing abilities of the board. (Cuff, 1973, p.
220)
When price fixing belatedly found its way into the
industrial controls system it was neither uniform nor fully
evolved. The Price Fixing Committee (PFC) had no legal
authority and had to depend on the WIB and the trades
themselves to administer price agreements. Its duties
included advising on prices for basic materials, acting as a
coordinating body for price policies, reviewing military
contracts on request and fixing prices on commandeered goods.
(Cuff, 1973, pp. 225)
Price fixing was informal and left a lot of room for
misinterpretation. There seems however, to have been some
sort of hard power to control industry but perhaps it was of
a psychological nature rather than legal. That might explain
why the relationship of the WIB and the PFC and the industries
themselves was so necessarily intimate.
However clumsy the workings of the WIB were, this can be
said of its accomplishments.
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...in that short period of time the Nation moved a long way
from individualism and free competition in the direction of
a planned and directed national mobilization. Selective
service, a "work or fight" program. .. industrial
mobilization, priorities and allocations, price control,
rationing, government control of industries that faltered
—
these and other measures had all been instituted. (Clem,
1983, p. 29)
However glorious those accomplishments may have been, they
all but dissolved with the dissolution of the WIB at the end
of WW I. The board recommended that a skeleton of staff be
continued after the close of WW I, that domestic sources of
key materials be developed and that small munitions industries
be maintained. Not one of these recommendations was
acknowledged, thus there were no economic preparedness
measures taken to assure readiness for national mobilization
at the onset of WW II. The U.S. relied heavily on "the
pursuit of a policy of neutrality and on pious agreements
outlawing war as an instrument of national policy." (Clem,
1983, p. 30)
B. WORLD WAR II
In terms of material allocations, WW II can be divided
into three procedural periods: (1) early material control
procedures, (2) the Production Requirements Plan, and (3)
the Controlled Materials Plan.
1 . Early Material Control Procedures
U.S. rearmament started in 1938. After the European
declaration of war in September 1939, the U.S. was besieged
with war orders that it was unprepared to handle. There were
24
as yet no controls in place to expedite or facilitate output
of materials. The War Production Board (WPB) was the primary
agency during WW II for directing industrial mobilization. It
was not instituted until January 16, 1942, although it had
predecessors that accomplished some mobilization. (Clem,
1983, p. 40) The powers of the WPB
...included: 1) General direction of the war procurement
and production program, 2) Determination of the policies,
plans, and procedures of the several Federal departments and
agencies having influence upon war procurement and
production, 3) Administration of priority grants and the
allocation of vital materials and production facilities.
(Clem, 1983, p. 41)
The early procedures can best be described as an
incremental process. The first phase set up a series of
preference ratings giving the military preference on output
from civilian industry. That is to say, the military had the
legal right over the civilian sector to use industry and
facilities with the objective of having the finished product
on hand as the need demanded. This plan focused primarily on
the end item. As the volume and numbers of preferences
increased, a more formal plan was developed to streamline the
process. This plan, adopted in March 1941, was called the
General Preference Order P-1. Priority ratings were issued to
goods by military officers in departmental positions. By
assigning preferences to a broad group of goods, this system
was the first evidence that government production
administrators were starting to focus on the materials and
components of production as opposed to the end item ordered by
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the military. Manufacturers were given authority to pass
these General Preference Orders on to their own sub-
contractors and suppliers.
The number of preference ratings increased
significantly due to abuses of the grouping procedure and the
ability of manufacturers to pass the preference orders down
the line. Subcontractors found themselves forced to identify
their output components and material requirements with end
products of which they had no clear understanding. Moreover,
confusion over what materials took precedence ensued. Since
the same "critical materials" were universally critical to all
producers of war goods, the total supply of critical materials
was jeopardized by the P-1 rulings. A new system was needed
to reduce the number of orders and save on material resources
that were becoming scarce. This new system was referred to as
Conservation Orders. These orders were assigned the letter
"M" and attempted to allocate materials to specific preference
orders. The outcome of this methodology was a shift in
emphasis from production to awareness that critical materials
were finite and, therefore, their use was restricted to the
most emergent needs. M orders were created to help the Office
of Production Management and the War Production Board decide
who really needed what critical materials and when. It is
reasonable to assume that each of these two parties felt their
needs were greater that the others. (Novick, Anshen,
Truppner, 1949, pp. 35-37)
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As the list of "critical materials" increased, and it
could not help but increase, a new control device emerged.
The next set of ratings, although initially sponsored
by the army, were issued by the War Production Board and were
called the Limitation Orders. These were developed to deal
with the growing scarcity of labor, materials, and production
facilities. The military services were exempted wholly or in
part. (Department of the Army, 1959, p. 605) These orders
were designed to limit or to stop the production of goods not
in support of the war effort. During this same time, a series
of Priority Regulations were issued to provide further
guidance and direction.
The combined inadequacies of these fragmented orders
resulted in the development of a more comprehensive approach
to priorities and allocations. This system was called the
Defense Supplies Rating Plan. This Plan started out as a
voluntary system for manufacturers to match requirements with
orders. These requirements would be assigned a priority which
would accompany the manufacturer's purchase order that went
down to his suppliers. Manufacturer's inventories and
consumption of materials were starting to be monitored from
information that the manufacturers provided with their
allocation request. Manufacturers made their requests on a
Form PD-25, "Report of Requirements for Scarce Materials."
The next logical step was to make this plan mandatory for
manufacturers who used more than $5000 worth of specific
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critical materials during a calendar quarter. Specific
critical materials-critical metals included aluminum, nickel,
iron, brass, copper, and steel. These were controlled by the
Production Requirements Plan. A special committee established
by the War Production Board, the "Requirements Committee,"
consisting of representatives from the War Department, the
Navy Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of
Lend-Lease Administration, the U.S. Maritime Commission and
the War Production Board division of Civilian Supply, was
designated to relate supply and requirements of critical
materials problems. (Department of the Army, 1959, pp.
103,106) A sense of order was beginning to develop.
2 . The Production Requirements Plan
In June 1942, some seven months after the start of WW
II, the Production Requirements Plan (PRP) was issued under
Priorities Regulation No. 11. This was the first formal
comprehensive materials control plan in U.S. history. The
plan contained the positive features of the fragmented plans
described above. Here, as in the Defense Supplies Rating
Plan, manufacturers using more than $5000 worth of specific
critical materials in a calendar quarter were required to
request authorization under the PRP prior to purchasing
specific critical materials. This system had binding
precedence over the majority of the previous priorities and
allocations systems. PRP functioned as a simple clearing
house where manufacturers submitted their allocation requests
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for a quarter to the Requirements Committee of the War
Production Board. This Committee would establish distribution
policies and pass the actual allocation function to the
Industry Branches of the War Production Board and the military
services. These two groups would actually approve the
allocation requests in accordance with the distribution
polices and information such as the manufacturer's current
inventory status, criticality of production and past usage
data. This information was submitted on the original
allocation request (a modified PD-25 form) . Thus a
considerable amount of effort was expended to try and balance
available supply with demand in the way that would most
efficiently support the war effort. (Novick, Anshen,
Truppner, 1949, p. 116)
3 . The Controlled Materials Plan
As with previous systems, the Controlled Materials
Plan (CMP), initiated on 1 April 1943, attempted to included
all of the positive aspects of its predecessor, the Production
Requirements Plan. The CMP retained a portion of the
horizontal allocation procedure but differed fundamentally
from the PRP in that it focused primarily on essential
programs as opposed to specific product groups. It also
limited its administrative scope to a few specific but
fundamental commodities. Control of these commodities, it was
thought, would provide control over the majority of other
scarce materials. A great deal of time and effort was
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expended to analyze the mistakes of previous material control
procedures, especially the PRP. Modern management techniques
such as the use of statistics and accounting procedures were
incorporated into the administration of the system. This
type of allocation was referred to as a vertical system. CMP
can best be described as follows:
The fundamental objectives of the Controlled Materials
Plan were clear from the start. They were: (1) to assure
a balance between supply and demand for the principal
production materials designated under the plan as
"controlled materials"—carbon and alloy steel, copper,
brass, and aluminum; (2) to secure that balance by a
coordinated review of military, export, and essential
civilian programs in terms of their controlled material
equivalents and by adjustments wherever necessary, to yield
that total commitment of our production resources calculated
to secure maximum output for world military victory; (3) to
schedule production for each approved end-product program in
order to secure the maximum level of balance output at all
levels of production from metal mill to final assembly
plant; (4) to maintain continuing control over production
and over the distribution of materials required to support
approved production levels in all parts of the economy; and
above all (5) to cut down the size of the total war
production program to realistic proportions by expressing
all projects in addable currency common to virtually all
programs—steel, copper, and aluminum. (Novick, Anshen,
Truppner, 1949, p. 166)
Theoretically, in a vertical allocation system,
materials would be allocated to a prime contractor who then
would match suppliers with necessary quantities of materials.
(Novick, Anshen, Truppner, 1949, p. 134) Material requirement






3. brass mill copper products
4. wire mill copper products
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5. 4 shapes of copper-brass alloy
sheet and strip
rods, bars
wire, tubing, and pipe
foundry products









unclassified. (Novick, Anshen, Truppner, 1949, p.
169)
The prime contractor would combine his and his suppliers'
requirements and submit these to the procurement agency from
which he was awarded his contract. The procurement agencies
would in turn total their contractors' requests and submit
these by program to the controlled-material branches and the
Requirements Committee of the War Production Board. The
controlled material branches would look at the requests,
production schedules and lead times, assess projected supply,
and recommend specific allocation plans to the Requirements
Committee. The Requirements Committee would then make the
final allocation decisions. These decisions were forwarded to
the procurement agencies who would pass them on to the prime
contractors, who would then pass them down to his vendors.
The material suppliers required their customers to include the
agency program number on each purchase order in addition to
allocation information. The controlled-material agencies
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required that the material suppliers keep track by agency
program numbers, all orders and shipments.
The vertical system just described applied to the
majority of war-related products. These products were
classified as Class A products under CMP. Horizontal
allocation, similar to that used in the PRP, applied to
another group of products that became known as Class B
products. Class B products were defined generally as off-the-
shelf-type items or items whose ingredients would not fit into
the vertical system of allocation. Class B product
manufacturers submitted their allocation requirements directly
to the specific industry branches of the War Production Board.
C. KOREAN WAR
Title I of the Defense Production Act of 1950 authorizes
the President of the United States to set priorities and
allocations to ensure American national security. Executive
Order 10480 dated 18 August 1953, established two systems to
accomplish this task: (1) the Defense Priorities System, and
(2) the Defense Material System. (Clem, 1983, p. 91)
1 . The Defense Priorities System
The Defense Priorities System (DPS) worked by using
two general priority guidelines, "DX" rating and "DO" rating.
"DX" ratings are used only for critical national programs
approved by the President. "DO" ratings are given to all
other Defense Programs. The hierarchy of order is simply that
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"DX"-rated programs take precedence over "DO"-rated programs
and "DO"-rated programs take precedence over un-rated
programs.
2 . The Defense Material System i
The Defense Material System (DMS) works in conjunction
with DPS to allocate critical materials to national defense
programs. The system includes a program whereby material
producers agree to "set aside" a specific percentage of their
output based on past-production rates, for national defense
use.
Specifically, material producers, such as a foundry,
would set aside a certain percentage of its output to be
allocated to a Defense contractor or subcontractor. This
allocation process would follow the DPS priority system where
the foundry would fill all its "DX" rated orders first, then
"DO," and then un-rated DoD orders (usually a DoD contractor's
purchase order) . The foundry would fill the orders in this
fashion up to the maximum limit of its set-aside percentage.
It would then be free to fill orders in any way that the
company saw fit. In this way, material producers would not be
unfairly called upon to provide materials to DoD but rather
the DoD business would be shared among all suppliers. During
a partial mobilization or simply during a time of accelerated
DoD orders for war, material suppliers may have pre-arranged
formal or informal agreements with their customers. It may be
considered bad business to supply DoD and not to supply their
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customers with the material it needs. If the material
supplier and his customers know that the material supplier
only needs to supply a certain percentage and that this is a
national defense program, the status quo business environment
may not be severely altered. The DMS set-aside program
covered the following materials: steel, aluminum, copper, and
nickel alloys.
One's observations about the history of industrial
mobilization might compel one to believe that WW I and WW II
might have been won more quickly and less expensively and that
better planning might have expedited the victory. This might
be so, but it is well to remember that in spite of the
incredible challenges that both wars presented, both wars were
victories and that the challenges confronting planners during
those wars aren't all that different from today's
challenges--"modern wars are fought, not by armies, but by
nations, and that the whole moral, spiritual and physical
energy of the Nation must be summoned to the struggle."
(Clem, 1983, p. 12)
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IV. THE DEFENSE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION SYSTEM
On August 29, 1984 the Defense Priorities and Allocation
System (DPAS) was established by direction of the Department
of Commerce, the Office of Industrial Resource Administration.
This system was essentially a combination of the DPS and DMS
.
These former systems were thus cancelled and the new set of
regulations covering DPAS were published in the Code of
Federal Regulations, specifically, 15 CFR 350.
The goals of the DPAS are (1) to assume the timely
availability of industrial resources to meet current
national defense requirements and (2) to provide a framework
for rapid industrial mobilization in the case of national
emergency. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984, p. v)
A. REVIEW OF DPAS REGULATIONS
A brief review of the governing directives of DPAS is
appropriate because of the pervasive affect of this system.
15 CFR 350, the basic directive, will be reviewed along with
the applicable requirements of the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) , and an operating regulation, the Defense
Logistics Agency manual, DLAM 8300.1.
1. 15 CFR 350
Operating in an almost identical fashion to the DPS,
DPAS uses the same "DX" and "DO" priority ratings. The same
precedence structure is maintained in that "DX"-rated orders
take precedence over "DO"-rated orders, and "DO"-rated orders
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take precedence over un-rated orders. A similar set of
program identification symbols are used to identify specific
authorized programs. Appendix A is the current list of
authorized programs. All orders of the same rating, i.e.,
"DX" or "DO," or un-rated orders have the same precedence
regardless of individual programs. This helps to eliminate
inter-service rivalries and helps to limit the tendency of
assigning high priorities to all material purchase orders. In
this case the same priority ratings are passed down from prime
contractor all the way to the lowest tier. Each tier would
have an array of "DX," "DO," and un-rated orders. As with the
DPS, the material producers would be required to fill the "DX"
rated order first, up to a specified amount of material in a
given time interval, then "DO," then un-rated orders. Under
DPAS , the set-aside program applies currently to four general
commodities, steel, copper, aluminum, and nickel alloys. This
could be expanded to include other critical items during an
emergency. A sample of the set-aside percentages are listed
in Appendix B.
In the case of conflicts, the Department of Commerce
has the legal authority to issue "Rating Authorizations,
Directives, Letters of Understanding, Set-asides, and
compliance documents" (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984, p.
5) to civilian and other government agencies. It should be
noted that a Department of Commerce Directive could take
precedence over a "DX"-rated order.
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2 . Defense Logistic Agency Manual 8300.1
The Defense Contract Administration System was chosen
to review because of the broad interface with both the DoD
contracting organization that assigns priority ratings to
contracts and the regional and field Defense Contract
Administration System offices. These offices are Defense
Contract Administration System Region (DCASR) and Defense
Contract Administration System Management Area (DCASMA) . They
directly review the actions of DoD contractors in their region
and local areas.
The DCASR and DCASMA use the Defense Logistics Agency
Manual (DLAM) 8 3 00.1, Production Manual For Contract
Administration Services for its daily operating manual.
In developing this manual, the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) uses as its authority, the authority delegated
from the Department of Commerce down to the military agencies
including DLA. The basic references DLA uses as a foundation
for this manual are: 15 CFR 350, FAR, and DoDD 4400.1 (DoD
Priorities and Allocation Manual)
.
The DLAM 8300.1 covers the basic facets of the DPAS as
discussed in section (1) above, but more importantly this
publication addresses the actual procedures used at the field
level where the majority of the DPAS actions would take place.
Actual procedures are delegated to the local DCASMA where
usually a Civil Service employee (GS-11) working under a
Industrial Specialist (IS) job classification, would act as
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the first point of contact between the contractor and the
government for DPAS-related issues. The IS would also
function as the eyes and ears of the government in terms of
ensuring the contractor's compliance with the DPAS.
In the particular case of materials allocation covered
under DPAS, the IS would check to see that the contractor has
placed rated orders, i.e., "DX" or "DO," in accordance with
the contract in sufficient time to meet the production
schedule. The IS may spot-check this at each level of the
contracting chain to ensure that correct ratings have been
passed down and that the individual contractors and suppliers
are in compliance with the DPAS. For large contracts the IS
may be required to provide material requirements data to the
Procurement Contracting Officer just prior to contract award
or during actual contract performance. The IS will keep a
ledger for the receipt and acceptance of rated orders for the
purpose of audit. (U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, 1986, pp.
5-21)
Finally, the IS will be the first point of contact to
assist the contractor at any time with expediting of
problematic materials. This assistance may be simply a call
to the contractor's supplier to explain the requirements of
the DPAS, or acting as liaison between the contractor and the
Administrating Contractor Officer (ACO) to work out a
substitute material. Assistance may involve helping the
contractor fill out a Request For Special Priorities
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Assistance (ITA-999) which will ultimately be acted on by
Department of Commerce.
3 . Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Subpart
12.300 requires federal contracting officers to adhere to the
regulations of DPAS . The FAR provides a brief background for
the contracting officers concerning DPAS. A procedures
section itemizes the action that a contracting officer must
take which includes a list of items that a rated order must
include. These requirements are listed below:
1. a priority rating of "DO" or "DX" and a program
identification symbol.
2. a required delivery date.
3. a signature of an individual authorized to sign rated
orders. (U.S. Department of Defense, General Services
Administration, and National Space and Aeronautics
Administration, 1986, p. 12-4)
Additionally, the FAR requires agencies to provide
contracting officers with guidance concerning DPAS and
requires contracting officers to report any DPAS violations to
the Department of Commerce. Finally, the FAR requires that
contracting officers put the provision, 52.212-7, Notice of
Priority Rating for National Defense Use, into every
solicitation with a rated order and to include the clause,
52.212-8, Defense Priority and Allocation Requirements, into
all contracts with rated orders. (U.S. Department of Defense,
General Services Administration, and National Space and
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Aeronautics Administration, 1986, p. 2-20) Copies of the
official provision and clause are included in Appendix C.
B. DPAS AT THE DEFENSE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION SERVICES
In the 1960s, DoD organized the Defense Contract
Administrative Services (DCAS) . This organization was to
provide a single and more consistent DoD contract
administration organization for all DoD contracts regardless
of Service. DCAS is organized on a geographic basis with nine
regions scattered throughout continental United States and its
territories. These regions, called Defense Contract
Administrative Services Regions (DCASRs) , are further broken
down by geographic areas called Defense Contract
Administrative Services Management Areas (DCASMAs) and Defense
Contract Administrative Services Plant Representative Offices
(DCASPROs) . DCASMAs and DCASPROs are the contractors' first
point of contact for contract administration and the DoD's
primary representative to industry for day-to-day contract
administration. (U.S. Department of the Air Force, pp. 16-17)
This section is based on interviews with personnel at
Defense Contract Administrative Services Region (DCASR) Los
Angeles and Defense Contract Administration Services
Management Area (DCASMA) San Francisco. An Industrial
Specialist (IS) was interviewed at both the DCASR AND DCASMA.
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1. DPAS at a DCASR
Ms. Jessie M. Jackson, Industrial Specialist (Staff),
was interviewed at the DCASR Los Angeles on 17 October 1989.
She is part of the Administration-Production Branch of the
Directorate of Contracts. In describing her daily duties, Ms.
Jackson stated that she works as a consultant to the
Industrial Specialists (IS) in her region. There are 12
Defense Contract Administration Offices (CAOs) , referred to as
field offices in Ms. Jackson's region. Ms. Jackson came from
a field office and so she is able to provide good insight.
She has worked in the industrial/production area for most of
her 3 years of government service and has seen the many
changes to the Defense Production Act.
Ms. Jackson also collects management information from
the CAOs for collation and forwarding to DLA headquarters.
Management information includes the number of ITA-999 forms
submitted, the number of Form DD 691 requests for rating
authority for production or construction equipment, and the
number of persons both government and contractor personnel who
were given government sponsored DPAS training. This
information is then collected from the various regions by DLA
headquarters for inclusion in a nation-wide management
information report.
Ms. Jackson is part of the Directorate of Contracts,
Administration-Production (AP) branch. In the AP branch there
is at least one other person involved with DPAS in some
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fashion. That person is assigned the task of Industrial
Preparedness Planning (IPP) . This job is currently vacant and
is being handled by Ms. Jackson. One of the IPP
responsibilities is to assist the field offices in their
collection of DD Form 1519 data on a consultant-type basis.
At the time of my visit, Ms. Jackson, as part of the
IPP job she had assumed, was involved in a mobilization
exercise that had started the day prior to my visit and would
continue for the rest of the week. When asked, Ms. Jackson
informed me that they had these types of exercises about three
or four times a year.
Because of Ms. Jackson's past experience, I frequently
asked her to relate what would take place at the field level
by the IS who deals directly with the various contractors,
sub-contractors, and suppliers.
When asked what the field IS normally does, Ms.
Jackson stated that the field IS goes on pre-award surveys,
monitors the contractor's production control, assists with
shipping problems and monitors contractor's purchases (for
example to ensure that purchase orders had been made for
required production materials and that the appropriate "DX" or
"DO" rating was assigned)
.
When asked if she got involved with any expediting,
Ms. Jackson stated that expediting is done primarily by the
field IS. The field IS will assist the contractor in filling
out the ITA-999 and attempt to solve the problems at his level
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by contacting the contractor's supplier, or the Defense
Contract Administration Office closest to the supplier.
During this process, the field IS may contact Ms. Jackson for
advice and guidance. If the field IS is unable to solve the
problem at his level, Ms. Jackson will formally get involved,
and if she cannot resolve the issue, the ITA-999 may be
referred to Department of Commerce (DoC) who has legal
authority under DPAS and the Defense Production Act. Ms.
Jackson stated that most of the expediting was handled at the
field level. She was not aware of any recent interventions by
the DoC.
When asked how many expediting actions Ms. Jackson
referred to her management information documentation which
provided monthly figures for her region. A total of 102 ITA-
999 forms were processed in 1988.
Ms. Jackson indicated that the system is designed to
operate in the type of economy we have today. It is inferred
that Ms. Jackson means that the DPAS is designed to operate
in a peace-time mixed-market economy.
Ms. Jackson showed me a management information report
for her region. This information was passed to DLA
headquarters for consolidation with the other regions.
When asked how the set-aside program operates, Ms.
Jackson stated that not much emphasis is placed on the set-
aside program now. There have been no reports made on it for
about four years.
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When asked if many of the contractors in her region
complain of any shortages, or hard-to-get items, components,
or materials, Ms. Jackson stated this is usually best
evaluated at the field level. Nevertheless, Ms. Jackson
indicated that from her experience, castings, titanium, and
some electronic items were problematic and should therefore
be added to the four critical metals presently under DPAS
.
When asked how do you monitor rated orders of your
contractors, sub-contractors, Ms. Jackson stated that this
usually done at the field level using an automated system
called the Production Administration Delinquency Report
(PADR) . Ms. Jackson did not have a copy to give me, but she
showed me a report that contained significant detail for me to
conclude that the government was keeping good close watch over
the rated orders. This report is called "Requested Energy
Crisis Production Status" and is provided in Appendix D. Un-
rated orders are monitored on the PADR.
When asked how do you track or review the scheduling
of rated orders, Ms. Jackson stated that they do not.
When asked what feedback system do they use, Ms.
Jackson stated that this is usually done at the field level
using the PADR. Additionally, when a contract involves a new
defense contractor or a contractor with a history of delivery
or compliance problems, the field IS can check to ensure the
contractor is or has the capability to comply with the DPAS by
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using Appendix C to the DLAM 8300.1. This comprehensive check
list is provided in Appendix B.
When asked if contractors were tied to her
electronically to provide her with information, Ms. Jackson
stated that they were not. Ms. Jackson indicated that the
field level utilizes the PADR to trace order for timeliness to
ensure that items are on schedule. However they will only
appear when they are delinquent and then show up on the PADR.
Since contractors dislike negative visibility
according to Ms. Jackson, there have been no legal problem
that she is aware of, e.g., contractor refusing to
participate.
According to Ms. Jackson, DPAS is self-executing as it
is meant to be, and with the help, plus oversight by the field
ISs, and support of the various DCASRs and procurement
offices, the system operated by itself.
Ms. Jackson stated that the IPP person also works on
DPAS to a limited extent. Ms. Jackson indicated that prime
contractors are required to train their sub-contractors and
suppliers. However, the government will provide training to
the prime, his sub-contractors and suppliers when any of these
are new to government contracting. Ms. Jackson stated that
usually the local IS will send out a letter of intro(3uction to
the new government contractor and offer DPAS training services
to the new contractor. This training has been given at a
government location or on the contractor's site. Ms. Jackson
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referred to a management report that demonstrated that
provision was made for 240 persons under the Los Angeles
region to receive training in DPAS from government personnel
in 1988. This training consisted primarily of showing a
professionally done video on DPAS. Persons trained include
both government personnel and contractor. However, according
to Ms. Jackson, it is primarily made up of contractor, sub-
contractor and supplier personnel.
Ms. Jackson felt that generally the contractors have
a positive attitude about DPAS. In many ways contractors
benefit from the system because DPAS can be used to expedite
hard-to-get material. Ms. Jackson presented a copy of a
speech given by the DPAS coordinator of a government
contractor. The speech showed the importance that this
particular firm places on DPAS and the widespread effect DPAS
has on a company. Ms. Jackson also indicated that the DCASMAs
worked with DPAS frequently and that the field level IS is
critical and very much involved. She does not use DD 1519
forms in her work. The IPP person does work with these a
little at the regional level. However, the IS at the field
level works with the local contractors to assist them in
submitting a DD 1519 form.
Ms. Jackson has not heard of any rated order being
rejected. Rated orders are monitored at the field level using
the PADR. Ms. Jackson feels that the current DPAS is capable
of expanding to accommodate increased industrial mobilization
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levels or stages. However Ms. Jackson's main focus and
experience was on the operation of the system in a peace-time
environment. When asked if she felt rated orders are given
priority, Ms. Jackson emphasized that by law they have to be.
According to Ms. Jackson, DoC converted the DPS/DMS to
DPAS in 1984 because the DPS/DMS was hard to understand. It
was written in legal language and most of the contractors did
not understand it. DPAS is written more clearly and in
simple terms. Unlike DPS/DMS, the field activities were
receiving frequent inquiries from contractors on how they can
implement the program at their company. DPAS is just easier
to understand for the contractors.
As a final note, Ms. Jackson mentioned that the NAVSEA
Shipbuilding Support Office located at the Philadelphia Naval
Shipyard, publishes yearly a publication titled "Manufacturing
Lead Times." This publication is used by the ISs and
personnel involved in DPAS and IPP.
2. DPAS at a DCASMA
Mr. David Degl ' Innocenti is an Industrial Specialist
employed at the DCASMA San Francisco, located at San Bruno,
CA. He was interviewed by telephone on 23 October 1989. Mr.
Degl ' Innocenti stated he is the DCASMA 's Armed Service's
Production Planning Officer (ASPPO) . In this capacity he
works on Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP) and DPAS.
DPAS occupies about ten to 15 percent of his time. At DCASMA
San Francisco there are other ISs in the production branch and
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a few contract management assistants who touch on DPAS in
their positions, but Mr. Degl ' Innocenti stated that he is the
main point of contact at DCASMA.
When asked about material expediting, Mr. Degl'
Innocenti stated he most recently (this year) worked on
expediting specialized integrated circuits. The problem is
significant in that there is no other source for these
particular high tech chips. The problem appears to have been
with the supplier who for various reasons was unable to
deliver specialized IC chips that could pass the prime
contractor's quality/performance specifications. Mr.
Degl ' Innocenti did relate an example where he got involved in
a case where a government contractor working on a "DX"-rated
aerospace item needed to have the item tested. The item had
been scheduled with the only testing facility available for
this size of item, however the project missed the scheduled
date. The item was ready for test again, but the test
facility was scheduled for use by a commercial business and
the testing facility was not going to adjust the scheduled to
accommodate the government contractor. Mr. Degl ' Innocenti got
involved and told the testing facility that the item was a
"DX"-rated item and federal law required the testing facility
to schedule the item before other "DO"- or un-rated items.
The facility complied, explained to their commercial customer
that the "DX"-rated item must come first, and the problem was
resolved. When asked if DCASMA is tied electronically to
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their headquarters, Mr. Degl ' Innocent! responded that they are
connected through the management information system,
facsimile, and electronic mail, to the Region and various
other DCAS offices. When questioned about the set-aside
program, Mr. Delg' Innocenti was familiar, but indicated that
they did not operate the set-aside program at DCASMA San
Francisco.
In terms of contractors complaining of any shortages,
hard-to-get components or materials, Mr. Degl ' Innocenti stated
that IC chip packaging was mentioned by IC chip manufacturer
because this packaging is only made in Japan and Korea. When
asked about forgings or high tech materials, Mr. Degl'
Innocenti stated that the problem with these items appears to
be lead-time-related. Additionally, when asked if he thought
that DoC should add items or materials to the four critical
metals presently under DPAS , Mr. Degl ' Innocenti indicated
that IC packaging would be one option.
When asked about rated orders, Mr. Degl ' Innocenti
stated that the use of the Production Administration
Delinquency Report (PADR) is a centralized management system
that is available at DCASMA, DCASR, and where the accounting
and bill paying is accomplished, and it tracks all rated and
non-rated orders. The Requested Energy Crisis Production
Status report tracks "DX"-rated orders also. Additionally,
un-rated orders are also tracked on the PADR. When asked if
he tracks or reviews the scheduling of rated orders, Mr.
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Degl ' Innocent! responded that he does not on a regular basis.
He indicated that there are just too many. There is no way to
see if a rated order is on schedule, or components for the
rated order have been ordered because they do not know until
it is appears on the PADR as a delinquent item. If the
contract is a high visibility contract, DCASMA or the Program
Office may develop special reports for the contractor to
submit. He indicated that they do an on-site review of our
larger contractors once a year. This review consists of
reviewing the contractor's manufacturing scheduling and
purchasing system. At this time they will check to see if the
rated orders are being passed down to the sub-contractor and
supplier tiers, and that purchase orders are sent out in a
timely fashion. Mr. Degl ' Innocenti was not aware of any legal
problems, for example, vendors refusing to participate. Mr.
Degl • Innocenti was not aware of any rated order being
rejected. Additionally, Mr. Degl ' Innocenti related that he
sometimes has procedural errors with new or unfamiliar DPAS
users. One that he mentioned concerned the provision for
combining un-rated and rated orders to achieve a minimum order
quantity. This is allowed but the different items must be
itemized to show which components go to the "DX" and which go
with the un-rated order. One firm did not separate the two.
The problem for the supplier is that this gives or could give
the contractor an unfair advantage because the contractor
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could receive the un-rated components before a competitor who
has his order in first.
Asked about electronic data transfer (EDI) with any
of the local contractors, Mr. Degl ' Innocenti indicated that
there is no formal system. They have a facsimile capability,
however.
When asked if he thought that DPAS is really self-
executing, Mr. Degl • Innocenti, like Ms. Jackson, thought that
the DPAS is self-executing.
Concerning training of local contractors/sub-
contractors and suppliers, Mr. Degl ' Innocenti stated he tries
to get out into the field to meet with contractors and provide
training at least once or twice a month. Mr. Degl ' Innocenti
seems to think that the contractors are generally positive
about DPAS.
Mr. Degl ' Innocenti indicated he feels that DPAS is
capable of expanding to accommodate increased industrial
mobilization levels or stages but that new people would have
to be trained. There would be a time lag to get people
trained. He mentioned that recently he was visited by a group
who were part of the National Defense Executive Reserve, who
told him they are the ones who would do some of the allocation
type work in the event of mobilization. One of l^^^he men in
this group had both government and contractor experience.
When asked if he felt rated orders are given priority,
Mr. Degl ' Innocenti felt that they are.
51
One of the problems Mr. Degl • Innocent! mentions is
that the field ISs usually do not hear back concerning the
results of the ITA-999. This is bad for morale in particular,
but also it indicates that the follow-up program is
incomplete. Additionally that the system both from the
contractor point of view and the government point of view
works not to cure the cause of a material shortage but rather
treats the symptoms. Research indicated that usually the ITA-
999 were processed in a timely manner. Mr. Degl ' Innocenti
indicated he was given ten days but usually would have them
out in five days. Mr. Degl ' Innocenti estimated he processes
10-12 ITA-999 per year. The question remains how many ITA-
999s resulted in successful conclusions.
Mr. Degl ' Innocenti qualifies the DD form 1515 as one
of his main functions of his Industrial Planning Preparations
(IPP) task. Concerning the DD Form 1519, Mr. Degl ' Innocenti
noted with concern that the major buying commands figure out
what type of production they think they need to support
specific mobilization scenarios. Mr. Degl ' Innocenti tries to
get the contractors to sign up for production to match this
estimate. This is a voluntary program on the part of the
contractor. Mr. Degl ' Innocenti indicated that the estimated
production figures are often not sufficient to keep a line
open, plus it is very hard to get the contractor to complete
the DD 1519 for free when they are taken to task by the
government for numerous small paperwork requirements related
52
to ongoing contracts. It is difficult to reprimand or dog a
contractor on one hand, then go out and ask him to do work for
you for free on the other. Mr. Degl ' Innocenti also indicated
that the 1519 estimates required by the major buying
activities frequently changes, which reduces the credibility
of the system to the contractors.
It is interesting to note that at the time of the
interview Mr. Degl ' Innocenti was involved in a Residual
Capacity Assessment to assess the damage done to major DoD
contractors in the San Francisco area by the 17 October 1989
earthquake. Although he was not able to relate the result of
the assessment, he did indicate that some of the same start-
up problems that faced local officials and agencies would be
similar to what the DoD federal government would encounter in
a mobilization environment.
One idea Mr. Degl ' Innocenti had was to combine the
data on the 1519, figure out what materials are needed to
produce the stated production goals, then establish the
approximate supply data of available resources and set up a
recourse allocation system of available supply to the pre-
established DD 1519 production requirements. This sounds like
a feasible idea for the following reasons: it defines and
coordinates real mobilization planning; it provides a complete
picture and a first set of plans to use while the nation is
gearing up. Additionally, the set-up process itself would
provide an excellent test of the systems and a great learning
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tool for those involved. These, of course, would have to be
updated whenever there were changes to the DD 1519
requirements. It appears that these systems are not presently
tied together but could be and perhaps should be.
Mr. Degl • Innocenti ' s and Ms. Jackson's commentaries
lead me to conclude that DPAS has no formal process for
recommending items to DoC so they be added to the DPAS




A. CONCERNS ABOUT THE DEFENSE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION
SYSTEM
1. Chanqincf U.S. Industrial Base
The U.S. industrial base is different today than it
was when DPAS was first adopted. DPS and DMS , upon which DPAS
is based, were developed in the 1950s. America's industrial
base has changed since then. The U.S. has been shifting from
an industrial-based economy to a service-based economy. One
of the primary concepts of DPAS, that of control of national
production based on control of the four basic metals, would
loses some of its validity.
Two pertinent comments from the 1980 report of the
Defense Industrial Base Panel of the House Armed Services
Committee highlight key issues affecting DPAS.
The defense industrial base is unbalanced; excess production
capacity at the prime contractor level is not matched by
capacity at subcontractor level. The United States is
becoming increasingly dependent on foreign sources for
critical raw materials and for some specialized components
for military equipment. (Vawter, 1983, pp. 69-70)
One educator in the field of production management
summarizes the current trend:
1. Foreign manufacturers are building factories on U.S.
soil at unprecedented rates.
2. Foreign manufacturers are joining with U.S.
manufacturers to build factories in the United States
and become partners in producing products and selling
them in world markets.
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3. Foreign manufacturers are producing completed products
in their home counties that are then sold in the United
States under the brand names of U.S. manufacturers.
(Gaither, 1987, p. 848)
These circumstances create a more complex and dynamic
industrial environment than that encountered in the 1950s upon
which the current DPAS is based.
Fortunately, as material management has become more
complex and dynamic, so has industry's ability to deal with
these issues. Material management and production control has
benefited from the U.S.'s attempt to regain its productive
edge during the 1980s. Systems such as Material Requirements
Planning (MRP) and Just In Time (JIT)
,
are designed to more
accurately accomplish production planning which incorporates
required-delivery dates and quantities of materials needed.
The World Economy has essentially forced U.S. production
companies to use their resources and operating capital more
efficiently, including holding inventory to a minimum by
having it arrive just as it is needed in the production cycle.
This helps with resource allocation because it provides a more
accurate required-delivery date (RDD) and quantity figure,
while reducing the volume of scarce resources sitting idle in
companies warehouses.
Additionally, reduction in work in process inventory
(WIP) , scrap, and improved quality of final product, reduce
the need for raw-material requirements. New operating-
production application software programs based on MRP and JIT
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provide faster more accurate inputs to the allocation systems
and through modern telecommunication techniques such as
electronic data interchange (EDI) , or even a simple facsimile
system, these requirements could be sent to a centralized
allocation agency such as DOC or FEMA where national
requirements could be collated. These systems could then be
integrated into the agencies mainframe computer where,
combined with supply data sent in from producers, could all be
run against an automated allocation algorithm and specific
allocations could be sent back to suppliers, manufacturing
concerns, and DoD.
The task is formidable but it is possible. It would,
as we have seen in WW II, take a long time to develop. In the
event of mobilization, DPAS may work for a short time to
allocate resources to selected "DX" programs, but as shown in
WW II, as the list of "DX," or high priority programs
increases, the effectiveness of the allocation system
decreases and another control system is required.
Industry executives are putting more thought into
strategic materials and the effect that U.S. dependence on
foreign sources has on the corporate-business strategy. One
corporate Vice President for The Diebold Group, Inc.,
describes a computer software system that major manufacturers
would find essential.
A decision support system is required that identifies,
quantifies, prioritizes and evaluates critical supply issues
and integrates them into the company's strategic business
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planning. Such a system requires a joint effort by the
company's information technology, purchasing and strategic
planning functions. (Webber, 1988, p. 62)
Industry is identifying, quantifying, prioritizing,
and integrating the acquisition of critical materials,
providing useful research data, new ideas and is evolving
corporate plans ready to work with limited resources, and
plans to work within or around these limited resources thus
making the transition to increased material allocations during
mobilizations easier.
Additionally, these forward-looking companies
fundamentally will have less vulnerable products, but in terms
of DPAS and allocation procedures, these companies will have
developed useful decision support systems (DSSs) that could be
expanded by the central allocation agency, or exported for use
by other companies during mobilization.
Even though the industrial environment is more complex
and dynamic, the tools available to deal with this changing
environment are being developed by forward-looking companies.
Use of DSS may provide a leg up as the nation moves to a full-
scale mobilization posture and increased control over scarce
resources.
2 . Changes in the Prime, Vendor, and Supplier Tier
Structure
The current DPAS is essentially a combination and
simplification of the earlier DPS and DMS . The DPS/DMS was a
carryover from WW II and Korea. Changes in the structure of
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the defense industrial base from the 1940s and 1950s to the
1980s and 1990s may cause disturbances in the DPAS as it is
currently written. If that structure is altered it is logical
that so will function alter.
Numerous studies have been done to analyze the defense
industrial base. One of the most recent is the one completed
by The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
,
Washington, D.C. in 1989.
One of the key findings of this report is that the
defense industrial base has shrunk significantly in the 1980s.
For the purpose the study, CSIS limited the defense industrial
base into manufacturers of products for 215 critical defense
sectors. The finding was that "In 1982, there were 118,489
firms that provided goods to the DoD in the relevant defense
sectors. In 1987, only 38,007 firms in those sectors provided
good to DoD." (Blackwell, 1989, p. 31) Additionally, this
reduction occurred during a time when the total number of
firms in these manufacturers sectors serving both military and
civilian customers rose from 98,659 in 1972 to 150,000
estimated for 1987. The report also pointed out that the DOD
procurement budget went from $43,271 billion in 1982 to
$80,744 billion in 1987. (Blackwell, 1989, pp. 31-32)
The report highlighted additional concerns.
Some products no longer have more than one domestic
provider, including nuclear projectiles, depth charge
components, parachute recovery systems, some specialized
marine vessels, tanks, several and various textile and
clothing products. More than 280 product groups lost
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producers in those four years—more producers than those
continuing to do business with the DoD— indicating an
ominous trend for the near future. (Blackwell, 1989, pp.
34-35)
Additionally, in terms of the structure, the CSIS
report made the following comment:
Although the raw materials, basic supplies, and components
and sub assemblies tiers have either remained stable or have
become more competitive since 1947, the complete systems
tier has become dramatically more concentrated in the post
World War II era... it is clear that firms involved in making
ships, planes, and tanks for DoD are facing less competition
than those making the materials, hardware, and components
that go into those end items. (Blackwell, 1989, p. 35)
Utilizing data from the U.S. Department of Commerce's
Census of Manufactures for 1954 and 1982, it is clear that the
total number of manufacturing establishments has increased
significantly. This information is presented in Table 1.
Notice also that the following groups show a decline in the
number of establishments: tobacco products, texitiles,
apparel, lumber, furniture, and leather products. This is not
necessarily representative of the numbers of firms or
companies. When compared to Table 2, which shows the number
of employees in each industry group, a similiar decline is
observed. One explanation for this anomoly is that these
particular industries have replaced numerous manual tasks with
labor-saving devices. This move to automation will have
little impact on industrial preparedness planning in terms of
material management but should be considered as part of the
overall industrial preparedness planning process.
Neverthless, during a national mobilization, the majority of
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these establishments would be converted to war production.
This increase in the total number of establishments will make
it harder to coordinate production and allocation of resources
than experienced in WW II.
In a 1981 Defense Science Board report, Report Of The
Defense Science Board 1980 Summer Study Panel On Industrial
Responsiveness , the Board commented on the decrease in the
number of subcontractors and suppliers serving DoD and the
various areas where entire industries such as foundries have
closed down. Table 3 from the Defense Science Board Report








Titanium Wing Skins 2
Titanium Extrusions 1
Aerospace Fasteners Less than 24 out of
hundreds of fastener
companies
Air Frame Bearings—Special Ball 1
Needle Bearing Bearings 2
Mil. Spec. Qualified Connectors 3
Aircraft Landing Gear 3
Radomes 2
Image Converter Tube 1
Periscope Lenses 2
Optics Coatings 1
In most cases, all these suppliers are at capacity and have
substantial backlogs. (Defense Science Board, 1981, pp. 48-
49)
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Another change in the structure of the defense industry is the
change in the make-up of the large contractors (Defense
Science Board, 1981, pp. 46-51). The Board commented:
The large prime contractors and major subcontractors are no
longer stand-alone organizations devoted primarily to
defense business. The companies have become elements of
large multi-product, multi-market organizations,....
(Defense Science Board, 1981, p. 7)
Subcontractors, suppliers, and vendors of material and
components are apt to shy away from defense work, while
emerging companies will seek defense work but turn to
commercial work after they have become established, outgrown
government incentive programs, or become tired of excessive
government regulations. The large prime contractors, on the
other hand, although not under the intense competition that
the lower tier subcontractors are under, appear to be under
new pressures of profitability and government oversight. This
contractor turnover tends to undermine the stability of the
DPAS because each new player must be trained in the
requirements and procedures of the system. This instability
could prove disruptive during times of mobilization.
3 . General Concerns About DPAS
There appear to be no regional or local plans to
expand the DPAS in the event of mobilization. These plans
would be in the form of increased personnel, training for
these personnel, additional automated data processing
facilities, and formalized procedures.
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DPAS is designed as a self-executing system which
makes sense in a peacetime environment. Nevertheless, there
appear to be no plans or strategies at the regional or local
level to direct the management of the DPAS into a proactive
role in the allocation of scare materials and into a more
proactive role as an expediter of scarce materials and
components.
As suggested by Mr. Degl ' Innoceti , there may be
opportunities from the integration of IFF using the DD Form
1519 and DFAS . Allocation of resources could be accomplished
in advance of a mobilization based on the production
agreements/schedules detailed on the current DD 1519s. If this
were done, it could be a prototype for a larger allocation
system to be used to cover national allocation while serving
as a starting point during the initial stages of an industrial
mobilization.
It appeared from talking to both Mr. Degl • Innocenti
and Ms. Jackson, that there is no formal process for field
personnel to recommend items through their chain of command to
be added to the DPAS critical item list or even to the
National Defense Stockpile (NDS) . These people are at the
level where they can see the problem best.
Rated orders are not tracked during production except
by exception basis when they appear on the PADR. The DCAS
PADR is updated with the receipt of a DD Form 250, and so
there is really no system in place now for the government to
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track required delivery dates (RDDs) , to see if material
needed to support a rated production end item is received on
time to keep production on schedule. This is left up to the
contractor to manage.
Additionally, DPAS currently operates with basically
a three-fold classification system for priorities. During a
full mobilization, an expansion of the current system into a
more elaborate system with subordinate levels of priorities
under "DX" and "DO" categories may be required. Consideration
of the current Defense requisition priority system of Issue
Groups with subordinate priorities may be appropriate for
tight centralized control, when supplies of resources are
known and sufficient administrative and automated data
processing facilities are available.
As touched on earlier in this thesis, there is growing
concern over the increase of and the critical dependence that
U.S. industry has on foreign-owned domestic producers. The
point of concern is that DPAS authority is not extended to
foreign companies. Additionally, political concerns by the
foreign owners and their government may prevent the foreign
owned domestic producer from supplying necessary materials and
components to a U.S. mobilization. The following quote
provides an excellent illustration of the problem of foreign
ownership of domestic producers.
The Budd Company of Rochester, Michigan, is one of the major
suppliers of parts to the automobile industry. Owned by the
West German company, Thyssen A.G., Budd supplies all four
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major American auto companies with sheet metal parts, wheels
products, frames, and so forth. (Laudon and Laudon, 1988,
p. 154)
This issue raises serious political questions such as
government seizure that would have to be addressed by
legislation or Executive Order during an emergency. The
important point is that this area needs to be further
quantified, evaluated and contingency plans for different
levels of industrial mobilization need to be developed.
B. PREVIOUS STUDIES
The 1981 Report Of The Defense Science Board Summer Study
Panel On The U.S. Defense Industrial Base concluded that DPS
was not effective. The prime contractors appeared to comply
with the DPS. However, the subcontractor and suppliers at the
second and third tier levels had a compliance rate of 50 and
25 percent respectively. The prime reason given was the lack
of understanding about the system. Additionally, it appeared
that there was a general aversion against using the rating
with one's preferred suppliers for fear of upsetting the
relationships built up over time. The DMS , on the other hand,
was considered by the Board to operate effectively. The
Board, however, was concerned that the DMS ' s critical materi-
als was based on 1950s production patterns that may not be
adequate in the 1980s and beyond. (Clem, 1983, pp*. 118-119)
The problem of better educating all tiers of the defense
industrial base was largely resolved by the establishment of
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the DPAS in 1984. DPAS is easier to understand and more
emphasis is placed on contractor education to include a video-
tape program. The education process also helped to ensure
greater compliance because the contractors, subcontractors and
suppliers were informed about the legal requirements of DPAS.
Concern over critical materials appears to be under
consideration by DoC. DoC had conducted a study to appraise
the relevance of the critical materials, and this part of the
DPAS may be phased out. (Telephone conversation, 3 November
1989)
C. MOBILIZATION EXERCISES
Numerous mobilization exercises have been conducted since
the late 1970s. The majority of the results of these
exercises are classified. The following sections will discuss
some of the results of these exercises as they impact or
relate to DPAS.
1 . Nifty Nugget
In 1978 Nifty Nugget was conducted to test the
mobilization and deployment capabilities of relevant U.S.
Federal agencies, both military and civilian. The fundamental
finding centered on the nation's inability to support
mobilization in certain industrial sectors and the lack of
mobilization planning, both centralized and at the agency
level. (Clem, 1983, pp. 18-23)
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These shortcomings have largely been addressed.
Industrial-base issues have been surfaced and procedures
addressed for both centralized control and specific agencies
such as FEMA, DoC, and DoD. This has affected DPAS in a
positive way because it first highlighted the criticality of
specific materials and components essential to mobilization,
and second, it focused attention on reviewing or developing
procedures. Additionally, the need for centralized management
was given more attention. This centralized management is
similar to the WIB and WPB of WW I and WW II, and as in the
case in these previous wars, this type of centralized Board
played a large role and it could be projected that such a
Board would interact heavily with the DPAS during a future
mobilization.
2 . Proud Spirit
In 1980 Proud Spirit was conducted in a similar
concept to Nifty Nugget. The important difference is this
exercise was the participation of more civilian players.
FEMA, having been established following Nifty Nugget, took
responsibility for coordinating civilian Federal agencies.
The majority of the exercise results are classified, however,
the major findings of this exercise were similar to Nifty
Nugget and with the noticeable continued weakness in specific
industrial sectors necessary for mobilization and the
continued need to develop and refine management procedures at
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a centralized level and at the agency level. (Clem, 1983, pp.
18-23)
3 . Industrial Responsiveness Simulation
In Summer 1983, U.S. Industry found itself involved in
a DoD exercise dubbed an Industrial Responsiveness Simulation
(IRS). The object of this exercise was to evaluate industry's
ability to expand rapidly in a national emergency. It was a
test of production capacity. Industries were allowed free
rein with their creative imaginations for increasing
production. Cost effectiveness was not a consideration during
the exercise. (Vawter, 1985, p. 27)
Some revelations made by the study included serious
dependence problems related to offshore producers of
electronic components such as integrated circuits, industry
belief that some sort of government insurance or protection is
necessary to allow manufactures participation in more
sophisticated industries, long lead-times required by
subcontractors to provide materials and numerous procedural
constraints such as priority ratings, which reduced speedy
access to capacity. Equally distressing to rapid expansion
are Federal Acquisition Requisitions which even a national
emergency declaration would not relieve. It was also observed
by the industries participating in the exercise, that federal
funds must be actually, and not theoretically available.
(Vawter, 1985, pp. 29-32)
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On the bright side, conclusions were that contractors
could indeed increase production capacity and expand output
and at reasonable cost but with some conditions: production
rate will fluctuate with the economic conditions; second and
third tier supplies could bottleneck; the U.S. is and would be
dependent on offshore low cost labor foreign products; the
private sector might not provide an adequate production base;
critical materials which are not presently available in finite
and limited quantities could halt production. (Vawter, 1985,
pp. 3 2-33)
The federal government has several tasks to tackle to
enhance industrial responsiveness. Minimum capacities to meet
the demands in an emergency must be established, documented,
disseminated throughout industry and then funded. A formal
surge policy is essential and production capacity goals need
to be defined early on in the development of policy to assure
funding is available when it is needed. (Vawter, 1985, pp.
34-35)
Finally the DoD is lacking leadership to industry.
Much of this weak image would be strengthened by formal policy
(Vawter, 1985, p. 35) .
Earlier mobilization studies. Nifty Nugget in 1978 and
Proud Spirit in 1980, both Army Mobex-76 exercises, showed
that our mobilization preparedness falls short of acceptable,
that government procedures and organizations are deficient and
that manpower is lacking to effect a short-notice rapid
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deployment of sufficient force. (Pfaltzgraff and Ra'anan,
1983, p. 260)
D. STRUCTURE FOR CHANGE
1. Organization
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
,
established in 1979, is the federal government's overall
coordinator for industrial mobilization. This includes
industrial preparedness planning and actual administration.
FEMA is to provide guidance and coordination to the different
Executive agencies. (Clem, 1983, pp. 86-87)
Under FEMA guidance, DoC and DoD have specific
mobilization responsibilities.
Applicable Department of Commerce responsibilities
include:
Assuring that adequate supplies of industrial resources are
available to meet the requirements of defense, and that
industrial resources can be expanded in the event of
emergency. More specifically, it is charged with preparing
national emergency plans and preparedness programs covering:
—The development of control systems for priorities,
allocations, production, and distribution for materials and
other resources.
The purpose of the Department of Commerce's priorities and
allocation programs is to ensure the availability of
materials for defense production under normal conditions and
in emergencies. (Clem, 1983, pp. 90-91)
Applicable Department of Defense responsibilities
include:
—Provide specific strategic guidance for emergency
preparedness planning and programming.
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—Develop and furnish quantitative and time-phased military
requirements for selected end-items, supporting resources




—Plan for and administer priorities and allocations of
authority delegated to the Department of Defense.
—Assist the Department of Commerce in developing
production and distribution controls plans for use in an
emergency.
—Furnish advice and assistance on use of strategic and
critical materials in defense production. (Clem, 1983, pp.
89-90)
2 . New Technology
Developments in information systems used in industry
today provide possible solutions to allocation management
problems of any future mobilization. As mentioned earlier,
modern material management techniques such as JIT and MRP have
brought with them information systems. The following quote
describes a complex system, but one that has potential for use
in a centralized allocation system that may be set up during
a full scale mobilization.
Chrysler has set up electronic links between its data center
and those of its major suppliers like Budd. This linkage
permits major suppliers such as Budd to extract
manufacturing releases electronically through terminals
installed in all of Budd ' s work areas. Even the shipping
dock at Budd has a Chrysler terminal to verify current and
future orders.
All of the major U.S. auto companies have set up such
electronic supplier networks. .. .The Automotive Industry
Action Group (AIAG) is working to develop a common industry
standard. (Laudon and Laudon, 1988, p. 154)
Modern use of linear programming solving large
•c
allocation problems on mainframe computers not available
during previous industrial mobilizations provide possible
alternatives for use by a large centralized allocation agency.
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Additionally, once a linear program (LP) allocated available
resources, a decision support system (DSS) could be used to
allocate the available resources as recommended by the LP
solution.
To keep the centralized allocation agency from getting
too cumbersome, it could be organized into commodity branches
as was done during WW II. Micro-computer work stations could
be used to run smaller LP allocations and DSS to direct the
individual shipments of materials and components from the
supplier to the producer as recommended by the LP. The DSS
would recommend the most efficient and effective movement of
materials in terms of transportation costs and transit times
to meet production schedules.
The concern would be that overall program schedules,
i.e., involving different commodities would have to be
monitored. This could be resolved by industries using the JIT
concept. A tighter production schedule based on the small-lot
concept would generate more accurate RDDs for production
materials and components. This would facilitate management by
commodity and overall program production control would be left
to the contractor.
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VI. SUMMARY. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A . SUMMARY
This study was conducted with the objective of deteinnining
if the current DPAS will be able to adequately allocate
limited resources among the various civilian and military
production facilities during mobilization. Additionally,
secondary objectives included identifying current problems
facing DPAS, researching to see if current lessons learned
from past wars and recent mobilization exercises have been
incorporated into the DPAS, and identifying improvements that
could be made to the current system.
A comprehensive literature search was done by the Defense
Logistics Studies and Information Exchange (DLSIE) , Defense
Technology Information Center (DTIC) , and through Dialog
Information Service.
Chapter I provides brief information, objectives and scope
of the thesis. Chapter II provides some background on the
relevance of the current industrial mobilization planning, the
United State's dependence on foreign sources and scarcity of
Defense-related production materials, the current emphasis
placed on mobilization by the U.S. Navy, the use of material
allocation to control the wheels of national production during
an industrial mobilization, and finally, a brief look at some
generic methods used to control production using material
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allocation. Chapter III provides a historical review of
material allocation from WW I to Korea. Chapter IV provides
a comprehensive review of the current system for allocation,
the DPAS . Current regulations and an actual operation of DPAS
at the regional and field level are reviewed. Chapter V
discusses concerns about the DPAS. Material allocation and
DPAS in terms of recent mobilization exercises and past
mobilization studies is discussed. The last two sections of
this thesis address conclusions and provides recommendations.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. continues to be dependent on foreign sources for
raw materials and component parts, for high-technology defense
production and on foreign-owned U.S. -located production and
supplier companies. Both situations represent complicated
logistical and political issues.
The fundamental principal "control of production" is
achieved through control of supply of raw materials and the
means to use them requires preconceived legislation to ensure
such control.
Experiences from WW I and WW II show us that the Executive
and Legislative processes to set up an organization to
administer an allocation system are slow and usually formally-
sanctioned long after the need has arisen. This lag time
present in WW I and WW II was significant and if an effective
allocation system had been ready to use at the outbreak of
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hostilities or when defense production began to increase, it
may have shortened the war.
History has shown that usually a defense industrial-
production build-up will start prior to any declared state of
emergency and that some critical material and components will
become scarce prior to that declaration. It is important to
impose allocation controls just prior to the market forces
getting out of equilibrium as this build up occurs prior to
the declaration of emergency.
Where to place and who to place in charge of an allocation
system is based on political considerations as much as it is
based on logical managerial and organizational considerations.
History has shown that the success of any allocation program
is largely dependent on the personal attributes and
characteristics of the person in charge.
Success of the allocation system will depend to a large
degree on the thoroughness, and implementation plan. Some
type of comprehensive plan similar in detail to the CMP of WW
II needs to be set up in order to have an effective allocation
system.
Any allocation system would be centralized and be part of
a large bureaucratic organization like the WIB and WPB of WW
I and WW II respectively. It would involve significant
numbers of persons as did the systems used in the past. It
would be a large administrative undertaking.
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Controlled materials portion of DPAS, based on the
requirements of the 1950s, does not cover the critical
material essential to the production of modern weapon systems.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Legislation should be enacted now to expand the current
DPAS to include detailed allocation procedures to be used when
critical materials and components become scarce. By having a
system in law, much of the lag time experienced in the past
could be eliminated. However, it is not recommended that the
controlled materials portion of DPAS be dissolved, as this
would take us another step away from execution of activity in
an industrial mobilization. In other words, some mechanism
would be required to initiate the DPAS replacement plan which
inevitably would be time and man-power consumptive. Instead,
the present plan should be revised to include new controlling
materials that are currently scarce and provide for a periodic
review of what is qualified as "currently scarce." This new
list of controlled materials should be made permanent by law
with the provision that it be updated on an annual basis to
reflect the controlled materials that represent the current
and projected greatest risk to defense production during a
mobilization. This legislation would include authority for
DoC to implement allocation controls prior to a declaration of
an emergency. DoC under this legislation would be able to
allocate scare resources as defense production is building up
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prior to official declaration of an emergency and therefore
prevent the occurrence of severe shortages that would affect
critical defense programs. Studies are available that detail
the potential critical materials and components that impact
defense production. The plan may resemble a system where DoC
would provide an annual list to Congress of 20 materials or
components. An allocation control time period may be part of
the legislation that would require Congressional authority to
extend allocation control authority beyond 180 days from the
time DoC initiated the controls. These provisions would
hopefully satisfy specific industrial commodity concerns about
government manipulation of their industry and Congressional
concern over too much power in the Executive Branch. On the
basis of interviews it is evident that titanium, electronic
items, castings and IC chips need to be addressed in such a
DPAS revision as recommended above.
A core group of informed persons who can be called upon in
the event of an industrial mobilization should be established
and who should be habitually responsible for researching the
issue and collating new information and ideas as they arise,
so that time is not wasted on this effort at the onset of an
industrial mobilization.
A risk analysis of materials and components which would
•t
prove to have the highest risk of non-availability on the
basis of national origin of commodity and logistic pipeline is
recommended.
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It is recommended that a "straw man" plan for a full-scale
industrial mobilization be tailored to current 1990 and beyond
production materials usage patterns to the extent of copying
the CMP, the most successful plan used in WW II, to include
scarce component parts with actual phase-in processes tailored
to- fit management practices and techniques of today.
Specifically, the use of mainframe computers and micro/mini
computer work stations for use with LP models, expert systems,
decision support systems (DSS) , electronic data interchange
(EDI) and the inclusion of newer techniques of materials
management (e.g., JIT and MRP) in the "straw man" model. The
use of JIT and MRP and other modern materials management and
production control techniques provide more accurate material
quantity projections, more accurate production schedules and
more accurate required delivery dates for production input
materials.
The DoC and the delegate agencies such as DoD and DoE
should keep track of and provide input to, various industry
organizations in an attempt to come to an agreement on, or at
least find some avenue to facilitate the standardization of
automated material management/inventory control systems in
terms of EDI and data manipulation for use by a centralized
allocation agency during a mobilization.
An allocation group could be evolved from the National
Defense Executive Reserve (NDER) to administer an allocation
system of WW Il-type under a FEMA or DoC umbrella. DPAS
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planners should keep in mind that with expansion more trained
personnel are necessary at the outset.
Field ISs need ITA-999 feedback. Benefit could be
received by setting up and effective feedback system. Field
ISs find that DD Form 1519 estimates are inconsistent, thus
leaving a credibility gap with contractors. Mr. Degl
•
Innocent! recommends combining the data on the DD Form 1519
to discern what materials are needed to produce the stated
production goals, establish the approximate supply data of
available resources and then set up a resource allocation
system for available supply to the pre-established DD 1519
production requirements.
Furthermore, DPAS stands to learn a great deal by closely
scrutinizing the start up problems that local officials




AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS AND DELEGATE AGENCIES
Appendix A lists the programs and delegate agencies that
are authorized to use DPAS. The source is the DPAS handbook,
titled Defense Priorities & Allocation System , distributed by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Industrial Resource
Administration, International Trade Administration, dated
October 1984.
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Defense Priorities and Allocations System
SCHEDULE I TO PART 350
Authorized Programs and Delegate Agencies
The programs listed in this schedule have been authorized by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency for priorities and allocations
support under this regulation. They have equal preferential status
The Department of Commerce has authorized the Delegate Agencies to

















A7— Electronic and communicatioRs equipment
Bl Military building supplies
B8 Production equipment (for defense
contractor's account)
B9 Production equipment (Government owned)
C2 Department of Defense construction
C3 Maintenance, repair and operating
supplies (MRO) for Department of
Defense facilities
C8 Controlled materials for Defense
























Canadian miliury programs I Department of
D2 Canadian production and construction / Commerce
D3 Canadian atomic energy program I
Otbcr For«4gii Natiow
G I Certain munitions items purchased by
foreign governments through domestic
commercial channels for export Department of
G2 Certain direct defense needs of foreign / Commerce
governments other than Canada








El — Construction \
E2
—
Operations— including maintenance. I Department of
repair and operating supplies (MRO) I Energy
E3 Privatel) owned facilities f
OTHER ENERGY PROGRAMS:
Fl Exploration, production, refining \
and transportation I Department of
F2— Conservation j Energy
F3 Construction and Maintenance )
OTHER DEFENSE, ENERGY AND RELATED PROGRAMS:
H 1 — Certain combined orders (see section
350 17(c))
H2— Controlled materials producers
H3 Further converters (controlled
materials)
H4 Distributors of controlled materials
H5— Private domestic production
H6— Private domestic construction




K 1 — Federal supply items General Services
Administration





Appendix B lists the controlled materials in terms of type
and grade. The source is the DPAS handbook, titled Defense
Priorities & Allocation System , distributed by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Office of Industrial Resource
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SOLICITATION PROVISION AND CONTRACT CLAUSE
Appendix C is an excerpt from the "Federal Acquisition
Regulation," Federal Acquisition Circular 84-16
. dated May 3.0,
1986. It shows the required provision and clause that are




52.212-7 Notice of Priority Rating for National De-
fense Use.
As prescribed in 12.304(a), insert the following provi-
sion:
NOTICE OF PRIORITY RATING FOR NATIONAL
DEFENSE USE (MAY 1986)
Any contract awarded as a result of this solicitation
will be a C DX rated order; DO rated order cenified
for national defense use under the Defense Priorities and
Allocations System (DPAS) (15 CFR 350), and the Con-
tractor will be required to follow all of the requirements
of this regulation. [Contracting Officer check appro-
priate box.]
(End of provision)
52.212-8 Defense Priority and Allocation Require-
ments.
As prescribed in 12.304 (b), insen the following clause:
DEFENSE PRIORITY AND ALLOCATION
REQUIREMENTS (MAY 1986)
This is a rated order certified for national defense use,
and the Contractor shall follow all the requirements of





REQUESTED ENERGY CRISIS PRODUCTION STATUS REPORT
Appendix D is an excerpt from a Requested Energy Crisis
Production Status Report which is developed and maintained by
the Defense Contract Administration Services. It shows for
"DX"-rated orders the particular contractor name, location,







































o u >- B O































































<ez<<<<-<< KZ «•—'-< —
Z 3—I -< ^ -i—i k. b.>— uiiew) >- lA




«euQtiJ < BU O Ulk.O X -> V



















Barach, Bernard M. , "Priorities: The Synchronizing Force,"
Harvard Business Review , Spring, 1941.
Blackwell, James, Project Manager, Deterrence in Decay; The
" Future of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base . The Center for
Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1989.
Clarkson, Grovsner B. , Industrial America in the World War ,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923.
Clem, Harold, J., Mobilization Preparedness , National Defense
University Press, 1983.
Cuff, Robert D. , The War Industries Board , The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1973.
Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board
Summer Study Panel on Industrial Responsiveness , May 1981.
Ellison, John N. , Frumkin, Jeffery W. , Stanley, Timothy W.
,
Mobilizing U.S. Industry, A Vanishing Option for National
Security? , Westview Press, Inc., 1988.
Gaither, Norman, Production and Operations Management , CBS
College Publishing, 1987.
Laudon, Kenneth C. and Laudon, Jane Price, Management




"A Time For Stock-Taking," The Navy
Supply Corps Newsletter , Navy Publications and Forms
Center, V. 52, July/August 1989.
Mikesell, Nonfuel Minerals Foreign Dependence and National
Security , University of Michigan Press, 1987.
Novick, David, Anshen, Melvin, Truppner, W.C., Wartime
Production Controls , Columbia University Press, 1949.
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. , Ra'anan, Uri, The U.S. Defense
Mobilization Infrastructure: Problems and Priorities ,
Archon Books, 1983.
98
Smith, R. Elberton, United States Army In World War II. The
War Department, the Army and Economic Mobilization ,
Government Printing Office, 1959.
U.S. Department of the Air Force, Contract Administration
Volume 1 . Extension Course Institute, Air University, 1986.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Defense Priorities & Allocation
System , Government Printing Office, October 1984.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1982 Census
of Manufactures, General Summary , Government Printing
Office, March 1986.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1958 Census
of Manufactures, Summary Statistics , Government Printing
Office, 1961.
U.S. Department of the Defense, Logistics 2010 , Government
Printing Office, 1988.
U.S. Department Of Defense, General Services Administration,
and National Space and Aeronautics Administration, "Federal
Acquisition Regulation," Federal Acquisition Circular 84-
16 , Government Printing Office, May 30, 1986.
U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, Production Manual For Contract
Administration Services DLAM 8300.1 , Government Printing
Office, October 1986.
Telephone conversation between Mr. Richard V. Meyers, DPAS
Program Manager/Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of
Commerce and the author, 3 November 1989.
Vawter, Roderick, "Industry Looks at the U.S.'s Ability to
Surge," Defense Management Journal , Government Printing
Office, Second Quarter 1985.
Vawter, Roderick L.
,
Industrial Mobilization: The Relevant
History , National Defense University Press, 1983.
Webber, Michael D. , "Strategic Materials Planning Crucial for
IS," INFOSYSTEMS , January 1988.
Williams, Benjamin H.
,
The Economics of National Security
,
Volume XIII, "Production," Industrial College of The Armed





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexander, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. Prof. Paul M. Carrick, Code 54Ca 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
4. Mr. Richard V. Meyers 1
Program Manager/Compliance Officer
Defense Priorities And Allocation System
U.S. Department of Commerce
Room H-3878
Washington, D.C. 20230
5. Mr. David Degl ' Innocenti 1
Code GFAP
Defense Contract Administration Services
Management Area San Francisco California
San Bruno, California 94066
6. LCDR Robert D. Sutter, SC, USN 1
Supply Department
TRIDENT Refit Facility, Bangor
Silverdale, Washington 98315-5300
7. Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center











and Allocation System in
an industrial mobiliza-
tion.







and Allocation System in
an industrial mobiliza-
tion.

